Monday, March 17, 2008

North Korea

One of the perpetual frustrations in US foreign policy for 2 decades has been our absolute stumbling response to North Korea's nuclear intentions. Any rational observer must surely admit the Clinton administration's back-slapping self-congratulations were a bit premature. But that same observer must scratch the head in wide-eyed wonder and the aimless dance of the Bush Administration's 6 party talks.


An analysis of the history of this problem and a dissection of the last 7 years of our policies toward North Korean would surely take a cumbersome tome to detail. In short, I think it all boils down to 3 key points:


  1. It's not North Korea: A petty dictatorship which can't feed its own populace and which engages in blatant global narco-trafficking and counterfeiting of US currency is not our stumbling block. When interpreting the daily news out of this region, please don't fall into the trap of wondering "How does Kim Jong-il do it?" He doesn't. Any sort of naval blockade and economic sanctions supported by the US and China would quickly cripple this potbellied despite.


  2. South Korea: The sad reality is that the US has not had a strong partner in South Korea at the negotiating table. South Korea is separated from its deranged sister by an imaginary line drawn to win a quick peace. While the world could crush North Korea with economic sanctions, South Korea would be left of mop up the mess of fleeing refugees and familial ties which have bridged the Demilitarized Zone for half a century. These concerns have tied the hands of the US in pushing for negotiations which are stronger than South Korea is willing to pursue.


  3. China! China!: Many folks don't understand why China would ever support US policy toward North Korea. Won't China do anything possible to thwart our interests? Perhaps. But reality on the ground is far more basic than that. North Korea also poses a HUGE destabilizing, boiling pot of potential refugees. While China's economy is booming, it is extremely unstable and the addition of hundreds of thousands or millions of poverty stricken refugees won't help its stability. Well, isn't China concerned about a nuclear armed North Korea? Probably only marginally. North Korea exists largely because of the economic, agricultural and pharmaceutical aid of China. China's military might outstrips that of North Korea beyond any analogy of David and Goliath. So, in short, no – China is not that concerned about North Korea's nukes, but it is very concerned about onerous economic sanctions.


Based on the above, how can the US hope for any progress in this year? The answer lies in changing the dynamics of one of these points. In this case, South Korean's democratic electorate has decided for a change. The new South Korean government, headed by President Lee Myung-bak has strongly stated its intention to align with the US and its willingness to place pressure on North Korea again – changing years of South Korea's policy of friendship toward North Korea. So, perhaps, this impediment to progress may be adjusting into an additional push for progress.

With this change, the US now has some key momentum to move China. China, in addition to fearing economic instability from a refugee crisis also eagerly desires economic leadership in the Pacific realm. South Korea, not a small player in the new economy, may not be willing to work in unison with the US and Japan to build a network of supports for China and sanctions for North Korea which will move China into a more proactive role of ending North Korea's ambitions.

Kim Jong-il is China's lap dog. Present China with a much enlarged dog dish and I think they may be willing to neuter this tramp.


On Principle,

CBass







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